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TRIAL OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY BELLIGERENTS
CHARLES F. BARBER
The Supreme Court introduced a new test of military jurisdiction when
it decided in Ex parte Quinn.' that because the Nazi saboteurs were "unlaw-
ful enemy belligerents" they were subject to trial by military commission.
For a full understanding of the proper place of this newly discovered juris-
dictional principle in our military and constitutional law, it will be necessary
to examine the Articles of War to determine whether any or all of them
are applicable to the trial by military commission of "unlawful enemy bel-
ligerents," and if so to decide whether such Articles effect a valid congres-
sional limitation upon the power of the President as Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy. Since these problems involve "unlawful enemy
belligerents," it will be appropriate first to examine the meaning of the term.2
I. THE RULES OF WAR
When civilized peoples exult at the news that their bombers have devas-
tated a great city, one wonders what has become of the "laws of humanity
and the dictates of the public conscience," which not so long ago sought to
mitigate the severity of war by confining it, so far as possible, to the destruc-
tion of the armed forces of the enemy.3 One wonders if the so-called "rules
of war" are more than philosophers' revel-ies. A review of the morning
newspaper would indicate that in total war the humanitarian criterion, which
guides the judgment of international conferences in peace time as to accept-
able conduct in war, gives way to military "convenience" which looks pri-
marily to prospective advantage and balances that advantage against the
effect of certain retaliation. 4 This same review, however, would indicate that
1 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942). *2This article is concerned only with the law governing the trial and punishment of
offenders against the law of war. It discusses one class of cases in which persons not
members of our armed forces are subject to "military law." It does not deal with
the law of "military government" of occupied or conquered territory; neither does it
discuss "martial law" in domestic territory. The "military commissions" discussed
hereinafter are those appointed by military command to try offenses against the law of
war, and should be distinguished from the courts associated with military government
and those which administer martial law, bdth of which are also called "military com-
missions." See WEINER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw (1940) 6-7, 134-135;
Miller, Relation of Military to Civil and Administrative Tribunals in Tile of War
(1941) 7 OHIO ST. L. J. 188. Miller apparently overloofcs the military commission withjurisdiction over offenses against the law of war.3See preamble to HAGUE CONVENTION No. IV, Convention Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land (1907), 36 STAT. 2277' (1910) [hereinafter cited HAGUE IV
(1907)].
4E.g., when reports suggesting that gas might be used by the Axis against the
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certain standards of conduct, particularly as regards individuals, are in fact
maintained by the belligerents. Such conduct is not incidental, but rather is
a demonstration of adherence to certain still-honored "rules of war."
It was in comparatively recent times that it came to be recognized that
the long range interests of all concerned were best served by limiting the
scope of military operations, and that the object of war was to impose one's
will on the enemy, rather than to destroy him.5 It was thus only recently
that there was an area for the development of standards of decency in war
not inconsistent with attaining the objective for which one went to war.
Formal rules of war were first set down in Lieber's Civil War Instructions
for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field.' Sub-
sequently, nations entered into reciprocal' conventions having as their object
the mitigation of the suffering and hardships endured by the wounded7 and
prisoners of war,8 and the establishment of rules of warfare designed to out-
law practices which cause suffering out of proportion to the end gained
These international agreements, together with the -rules of warfare published
by the several nations for the guidance of their armies, the acts of the
belligerents, and the analyses of these acts published by students of military
Chinese and the Russians were received, the President (June 6, 1942; June 8, 1943)
and the Prime Minister (May 10, 1942) were quick to threaten deadly retaliation in
kind. This may have helped tip the scale of "advantage" in the mind of the enemy.
At any rate, gas warfare has not yet been generally employed, if at all.
5Cf. Cramer, Military Commissions (1942) 17 WASH. L. Rav. 247, 249. Major
General Cramer is currently the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army.
6Promulgated to the Union Forces as General Order No. 100 of 1863. "Not only
the first but the best book of regulations on the subject ever issued by an individual
nation on its own initiative." SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND (1911) 18. This code
served as a basis for future ifiternational discussions of the subject which culminafed
in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. See HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed.
1924) 469, n. 1; 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS (1896) 1204, n. 3
(hereinafter cited WINTHROP. WINTHROP was reprinted in 1920 in a small type, one
volume edition. The original pagination is shown in the reprint.). ". . . The Rules of
War are pervaded by one grand animating principle-to obtain justice as speedily as
,possible at the least possible cost of suffering and loss to the enemy, or to neutrals,
as the result of belligerent operations." RISLEY, THE LAw OF WAR (1897) 73. As
the methods and instrumentalities of war have changed, established rules have been
adopted to fit the new situation. For a current discussion of the basis for rules of war,
see Healy, Rules of War. "What Acts of War Are ustifiable?" (1941) 17 N. Z.
I. J. 129.7 E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick of Armies in the Field (1929), 47 STAT. 2074 (1932) ; HAGUE CONVENTION No. X,
Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime War of the Prijwciples of the Geneva Con-
vention (1907), 36 STAT. 2371 (1910).8E.g, HAGUE CONVENTION No. II, Conventio with Respect to Laws and Customs
of War on Land (1899), 32 STAT. 1803 (1902) ANNEX; § I, c. 2; HAGUE IV (1907)
ANNEX, § I, c. 2; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(1929), 47 STAT. 2021 (1932).9E.g., HAGUE IV (1907) ANNEX, § II, c. 1.
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and international law comprise the present day "common law of war."10
A review of events of this war would indicate that, as regards employment
of the means of warfare, the "common law of war" has little content. Ad-
herence to the rules of warfare is more evident, however, as regards the
conduct and status of soldiers and civilians as individuals. The soldier's
conduct in the field is still guided by manuals drawn up in accordance with
international conventions, and his treatment on, capture has been, on the
whole, in accordance with international usage. Thus the American soldier
is instructed, inter alia, rgot to kill or wound an enemy who has laid down
his arms and surrendered, or to declare that no quarter will be given, or to
employ arms or material of a nature to causi superfluous injury, or to make
improper use of a flag of truce, or to pillage a town or place even where
taken by assault,:" and if he is captured under conditions which entitle him
to treatment as a prisoner of war, he may expect to be humanely treated, to
be permitted to retain his personal belongings of a, nonmilitary nature, to
be confined only as an indispensable measure of safety, to be paid a wage
for all labor done suitable to the nature of the work, which pay-may be
expended toward his maintenance and toward improving his position, and
to be repatriated promptly after the conclusion of peace.' 2 Although the
years since the adoption of these rules have seen the development of sub-
marine, air, and other new forms of warfare, the rules have been generally
recognized as applicable to uniformed participants in the new forms of war-
fare. Otherwise the vicious circle of retaliation and counter-retaliation would
take a pointless toll. The present state of the law of war concerning prison-
ers of war is indicative of the change which has taken place since the time
when all war prisoners became the slaves of their captors, a practice recog-
nized by Grotius as still conformable to the law of nations, but which by
that time had been mitigated to the extent of permitting prisoners of war
to ransom themselves' from captivity.'"
Another development in the law of war centers about the distinction, now
I
'OSee Munson, The Argunzents in the Saboteur Trial (1942) 91 U. OF PA. L. REv.
239, 242. By reference to the law of war in Article of War 15, Congress has adopted
"the system of common law applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recog-
nized and deemed applicable by the courts" as part of the law of the land. See Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 30, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 12 (1942); The Lola, 175 U. S. 677, 700, 20
Sup. Ct. 290, 299 (1900).
L1RULES OF LAND WARFARE (U. S. War Dep't, 1940) §§ 25, 33, 34, 42, 61; HAGuE
IV (1907) ANNEx, Arts. 23, 28.
12 HAGUE IV (1907) ANNEx, Arts. 4-20. This convention, or the similar one of 1899,
supra note 8, has been ratified or affirned by forty-seven nations, including all the
principal belligerents in the present conflict.
'
3 See Twiss, THE LAW OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1875) § 177.
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universally recognized, between the armed forces and the peaceful popula-
tions of belligerent nations.' 4 The armed forces, by international agree-
ment, must carry arms openly and must wear a fixed, distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance. Provided they meet these conditions, individuals
are entitled, on capture, to be treated as prisoners of war. The peaceful
population, provided it remains peaceful, is entitled to be spared the impact
of war so far as is consistent with military operations. In accordance with
these principles, the enemy soldier who fails to wear markings which indi-
cate that he is a member of the armed forces, or the enemy civilian who is
in fact belligerent-the two amount to the same thing-are not entitled to
treatment as prisoners of war.' 5 Enemy spies and enemy marauders who
come through the lines in civilian dress or a false uniform to destroy war
materials, industrial facilities, or for any hostile purpose, are in this class.
They have committed no crime against international law; they are heroes on
the one side. But they are the most despised representative of the enemy
on the other. Though some have questioned their honor, none could question
their bravery. They are brave because, if captured, in accordance with uni-
versal custom they will be put to death.
Both the uniformed soldier whose individual conduct violates accepted
rules of war, and the apparent civilian who is in fact belligerent, are "un-
lawful enemy belligerents." Though they are universally recognized as be-
yond the law, they are customarily given a trial before being put to death
or otherwise punished.' 6 Such a trial is not in mitigation of punishment,
for the guilty suffer death. It is accorded rather to assure that only the
guilty are put to death and that those accused who are in fact entitled to
treatment as prisoners of war or as civilians are restored to that status.
Trials of persons charged as spies or for other reasons as unlawful enemy
belligerents, are an adjunct of every war. Occasionally such trials are accom-
1 4 HAGUE IV (1907) ANNEX, Art. 1. See also authorities cited in Ex parte Quirin,
317 U. S. 1, 30, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 12, n. 7 (1942). The general acceptance of this distinction
has been heralded as "the principal advance made by international law in treating war
primarily as an act of hostility between states rather than individuals." BATY AND
MORGAN, WAR, ITs CONDUCT AND LEGAL RESULTS (1915) 172.
I 5 RULES OF LAND WARFARE (U. S. War Dep't, 1940) § 351; MANUAL OF MILITARY
LAW (Great Britain War Office, 1929) §§ 445-451; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th
ed. 1924) 498-499; BATY AND MORGAN, loc. Cit. supra note 14; SPAIGHT, AIR PowEa
AND WAR RIGHTS (1924) 283. See also authorities cited in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S.
1, 31, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 12, n. 8, 14, n. 12 (1942).16
"No individual should be punished for an offense against the laws of war unless
pursuant to a sentence imposed after trial and conviction.... ." RULES OF LAND WARFARE
(U. S. War Dep't, 1940) § 356. In the case of spies, HAGUE IV (1907) ANNEX, Art.
30, requires a trial. See also PHIILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE GREAT WAR
(1915) 210; BENET, MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL (1868)
203, 211.
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panfed or followed by great public excitement; probably more often they
are passed over as a routine event of war. The wars in which the United
States has been involved have not been exceptions.17
II. THE CASE OF THE SABOTEURS' 8
In the hours of darkness, on or about June 13, 1942, four men, trained
in Germany in the art of sabotage and wearing the uniform of the German
Marine Infantry, landed on a Long Island beach from a submarine which
had escaped detection by our coast patrols. They brought with them certain
explosives, fuses, incendiary and timing devices. Immediately after landing
they buried their uniforms and instruments' of sabotage, and proceeded in
American-made civilian dress ,to New York City. On or about June 17,
1942, four other men landed on a Florida beach under similar circumstances.
All had been residents of the United States at one time; all had returned
to Germany within the decade prior to the outbreak of war; one claimed
'to be a citizen of the United States. All had received instructions in Ger-
many from an officer of the German High Command to destroy war indus-
tries and transportation facilities in the United States, for which they or
their relatives in Germany were to receive salary payments from the German
Government. All had received substantial sums of money, some of which was
in their possession when they were apprehended. One saboteur testified that he
bad been told that each of the accused had been assigned to a German army
'
1 The military trial and hanging of Major Andr6 of the British Army, who was
apprehended within the American lines in civilian clothing bearing information con-
cerning the defenses of the fort at West Point which he had just obtained from General
Benedict Arnold, is a familiar event of the Revolutionary period, as is the trial and
hanging of Nathan Hale by the British. Some eighteen other military trials of British
spies apprehended during the Revolutionary period and the War of 1812 are listed by
the Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 42, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 17, n. 14 (1942). During
the Mexican and Civil Wars there were many similar trials, the majority being trials
by military commissions. Id. at 32, 63 Sup. Ct. at 13, n. 10 (1942) ; DIGEST Os'S. J. A. G.
(1912) 1071; 2 WINTHROP 1296-1299. Two World War I court-martial trials of
German spies are referred to on pp. - infra.
ISThe case was argued before the Supreme Court on July 29 and 30, 1942. The Court
announced its decision, per curiam, the following day. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1,
18, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (July 31, 1942). Subsequently, an extended opinion was filed. 317
U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (Oct. 29, 1942). The facts are stated as they appear in the
extended opinion of the Court, supplemented in certain respects by facts declared to
have been admitted by the accused and set forth in Respondent's Answer to Petitions,
filed July 29, 1942. As the record of the proceedings before the military commission
has been classified as secret, it was not available to the writer. The case has been
much discussed. See, e.g., Cushman, Ex parte Quirn, et al.-The Nazi Saboteur-Case
(1942) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 54; Munson, The Arguments in the Saboteur Trial (1942)
91 U. oF PA. L. REv. 239; Cramer, Military Commissionr (1942) 17 WASH. L. Rv. 247.
Among the case notes are: Note (1943) 56 HARv. L. Rav. 631; Note (1942) 37 IL..
L. REv. 265; Note (1942) 41 MicH. L. REv. 481.
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unit before departure. They were instructed to commit no acts of sabotage
within ninety days after their arrival in America. At the time of their arrest
by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, less than two weeks after
landing, they had committed no acts of sabotage.
It was clear that the prisoners did not belong to the class of lawful bel-
ligerents entitled to status as prisoners of war, for after landing they did
not wear a fixed, distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance indicating
that they were members of the armed forces of Germany; nor did they
bear arms openly. If belligerents at\ all, they were unlawful belligerents
and according to the usages of war faced death at the hands of their captors.
The law of nations permitted trial and punishment of these eight men. 'The
law of the United States determined the form of trial.
On July 2, 1942, a military commission consisting of four major generals
and three brigadier generals was appointed by the President, as President
and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.19 The commission was
ordered to convene at Washington, D. C., on July 8, 1942, to try the prison-
ers "for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War." The
Attorney General and the Judge Advocate General of the Army were directed
to conduct the prosecution. The order further provided that:
"The Commission shall have power to and shall, as occasion requires,
make such rules for the conduct of the proceedings, consistent with
the powers of military commissions under the Articles of War, as it
shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of the matters before it.
Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the Presi-
dent of the Commission, have probative value to a reasonable man.
The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the Commis-
sion present -shall be necessary for a conviction or sentence. The record
of the trial, including any judgment or sentence, shall be transmitted
directly to me for my action thereon."
At the same time, the President, by proclamation,20 declared:
".. . that all persons who are subjects, citizens, or residents of any na-
tion at war with the United States or who give obedience to or act
under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war
enter or attempt to enter the United States . . . through coastal or
boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or
preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or vi6-
lations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be
privileged to seek any remedy ... in the courts of the United States. .. ."
197 FED. REG. 5103 (1942).20Proclamation No. 2561, 7 FED. REG. 5101 (1942).
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Charges supported by specifications, alleging violation of the law of war
and of Articles 81 and 82 of the Articles of War, and conspiracy to commit
the same, were duly filed with the commission by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department of the Army, and on July 8, 1942, the commission met
and proceeded with the trial. For sixteen days the commission heard the
evidence. At the close of the evidence, but before the argument of counsel,
seven of the prisoners petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States
for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. A special term of the Supreme
Court was convened on July 29, 1942, at which time the petitions were
presented in open court, and full oral argument was had thereon.2 1
The petitioners contended that under the Constitution of the United
States they were entitled to be tried in the civil courts with the safeguards,
including trial by jury, which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee
to all persons charged in such courts with criminal offenses. In any event,
they contended that the President's order which established the, commission,
and the actual procedure of the commission under the order, were in conflict
with the Articles of War as adopted by Congress, and that therefore any
conviction which might be obtained against them would be illegal and void,
and their detention for such trial likewise unlawful.
22
The government challenged th~se contentions, but argued in the first
instance that regardless of the merits, the petitioners must be excluded from
the courts both because they were unlawful enemy belligerents and because
the President's proclamation undertook to exclude them from the courts.
The Court summarily dismissed the argument, pointing out that nothing in
the proclamation precluded access to the courts for determining its applica-
bility to a particular case, nor did anything alleged preclude determination
by the courts as to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal, under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States, to try the charges preferred against
21While the argument was proceeding in the Supreme Court, the prisoners petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in which court appeals from the order of the district
court, 47 F. Supp. 431 (1942), denying their applications for leave to file petitions for
habeas corpus, were pending. Certiorari was granted, and the cases were decided
together.22
"When [the sentence of a court-martial has been] confirmed, it is altogether beyond
the jurisdiction or inquiry of any civil tribunal whatever, unless . . . having jurisdiction
over the subject matter, [the court-martial] has failed to observe the rules prescribed
by the statute for its exercise. . . . In such cases, everything which may be done is
void . . . and civil courts have never failed, upon a proper suit, to give a party redress,
who has been injured by a void process or a void judgment." Dynes v. Hoover, 20
How. 65, 81 (U. S. 1857). See also United States v. Brown, 206 U. S. 240, 244, 27
Sup. Ct. 620, 621 (1907) ; Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, 555-556, 7 Sup. Ct.
1141, 1146 (1887); cf. ScOTT, ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE MILITARY LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES (1873) 278, n. 1 (c).
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the petitioners.23 The Court then proceeded to a consideration of the merits.
The Court noted that the Constitution authorized the Commander in Chief
to direct the performance of those functions which may be performed by
the military in time of war, and that .Congress had explicitly recognized
the military commission appointed by military command, as an appropriate
tribunal for the trial of offenders against the law of war.24 After a review
of the history and cdntent of the common law of war, the Court held that
petitioners, charged with passing our military and naval lines and defenses
and going behind those lines in civilian dress and with hostile purposes, in
circumstances which made them enemy belligerents, were charged with a
violation of the law of war. It followed that the trial by military commission
was proper, unless prohibited by the Constitution. Specifically, it was argued
that the trial was subject to Article III, Section 2, and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, which require pre-
sentment by a grand jury in cases involving capital or otherwise infamous
crimes, and trial by jury in a civil court. The Court noted, however, that
military tribunals were not courts in the sense of the Judiciary Article,25
that these procedures were unknown to military trials, and that it had con-
sistently held that the Constitution, including the amendments, did not
intend to enlarge the right to trial by jury existing under the common law.2 6
The Court held, therefore, that the petitioners, including the one who
2,Nothing precluded the Court from considering these questions, but on the other
hand, because the petitioners were enemy belligerents they were without the protection
of the constitutional guarantees, and, hence could have been lawfully excluded from
the courts. See Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 122-123 (U. S. 1814) ; De Lacey
v. United States, 249 Fed. 625, 626 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Atkisson, The Constitutional
Sources of thw Laws of War, Sax. Doc. No. 86, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) 35; cf.
Ex parte Colonna, 314 U. S. 510, 511, 62 Sup. Ct. 373 (1942). The law of England is
the same. Rex v. Knockaloe Camp Commandant, 87 L. J. K. B. 43 (1917) ; Sylvester's
case, 7 Mod. 150, 87 Eng. Rep. R. 1157 (K. B. 1703). .
As the petitioners were "admitted enemy invaders," the basic fact of identity was not
disputed. This can be a very troublesome issue. The fact that the Court heard the
petition does not mean that unlawful enemy belligerents who succeed in getting into
the country have a right to a hearing before a civil court under the Constitution.
Rather it indicates that the civil courts may police the conduct of the military by
examining the constitutionality of asserted jurisdiction in cases where it deems such
inquiry appropriate.
24317 U. S. at 28-29, 63 Sup. Ct. at 11-12 (1942) ; Article of War 15, 41 STAT. 790,
(1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1486 (1940).
2-Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. -1863) (military commission); In re
Vidal, 179 U. S. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. 48 (1900) (court-martial).2 6See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63, 72-73, 51 Sup. Ct. 52, 53 (1930);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540,'549, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301, 1303 (1888). Hamilton wrote in
The Federalist (Dawson ed. 1863) 587: "I feel a deep and deliberate conviction that
there are many cases in which trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think so particularly
in cases which concern the public peace with foreign nations; that is, in most cases
where the question turns wholly on the law of nations."
[Vol. 29
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claimed to be a citizen,2 7 were lawfully placed on trial by the commission
without' a jury.
The Court noted that the petitioners were enemy belligerents. The rela-
tionship necessary to establish the association with the armed forces of the
enemy which gives one this status was not explained. In the Quirin case,
the petitioners were trained in Germany by officers of the German Army
and admitted by stipulation that -they acted "for and on behalf of the
German Reich, a belligerent enemy nation." That they were enemy belliger-
ents, therefore, was clear. The Court contrasted these facts to those of the
much debated Ex parte Milligan.2 8. It noted that Milligan, "a citizen twenty
years resident in Indiana, had never been a resident of any of the states
in rebellion, and that ". . . Milligan, not being a part of or associated with
the armed forces of the enemy, was a nonbelligerent, not subject to the law
of war."- 9 The fact that the petitioners in the Quirin case were "enemy bel-
ligerents" was crucial, for however hostile might be their intent, unless
they were a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, they
would not be subject to the international law of war which deals only with
the relations between nations at war, and individuals acting for, and on be-
half of, those nations. If not "enemy belligerents," they would be protected
by the Constitution of the United States, which is applicable to citizens and
aliens alike,s and could be tried by military tribunal only if they were
members of our military forces, persons made subject to the law of war by
the second' Article of War, or persons "whose offenses occur in the theater
of war, in the theater of operations, or in any place over which the military
forces have actual control and jurisdiction."'31
27The Court was express on this point. 317 U. S. at 37-38, 63 Sup. Ct. at 15 (1942).
This is probably the first judicial decision holding that a citizen who joins the enemy
loses rights pertaining to his person, as distinguished from rights pertaining to his
property. Compare Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121 (U. S. 1866), where the Court
declared that the law of war "can never be applied to citizens in states which have up-
held the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed," with 1 HALL, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1800) 346, where it is stated,
"that regularly when the king's courts are open, it is time of peace in judgment oflaw,."
284 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
29317 U. S. at 45, 63 Sup. Ct. at 19 (1942).
3OWong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977 (1896); see Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 724, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 1026 (1893).
31See Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-military Persons under the Arti-
cles of War (1919) 4 MINx. L. R-v. 78 (hereinafter cited Morgan). The quotation is
from Morgan at 107. Professor Morgan suggested that these cases were "cases arising
in the land ... forces," and hence within the express exception from the operation of
the amendments. Ibid. As indicated in note 2 supra, this article does not deal with the
situation where martial law has been declared.
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Any hostile act committed for or on behalf of the enemy is a belligerent
act. It is not necessary that the act be committed in the theater of war, as
is the case with spying. Agents who destroy war industries and supplies are
no less belligerents than are agents who destroy fortified places.3 2 In the
Quirin case, the petitioners crossed our military lines, or having crossed our
lines, remained in our territory without a uniform and with hostile intent.
On so entering, or on so remaining, without a uniform, the offense was com-
plete. In the Quirin case the petitioners had in fact passed our military
lines, and the decision was limited to the facts before the Court.3 The
rationale of the opinion, however, applicable to both citizens and aliens, goes
beyond the case where an enemy belligerent enters our territory with hostile
intent in time of war. Thus a person who owes allegiance to the United
States and has never left the country and who is accused of aiding the
enemy by hostile acts in a, locality far from the fighting front would be
subject to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal provided he were found to
be an "enemy belligerent. ' 34 The person has also committed an offense
against the United States traditionally punishable only in the civil courts
thereof save in cases arising in the land or naval forces. Since with a
finding that the person is an "enemy belligerent" the locality of the act is
immaterial, in a case like the one postulated the Court has sanctioned an
expanded jurisdiction of military tribunals by what would appear to be
the "subterfuge of a changed phraseology."3 5 If this has become the law,
the meaning of "enemy belligerent" is all the more important. Probably the
resident who hires limself out to an enemy agent-saboteur, or a sympathizer
32317 U. S. at 37, 63 Sup. Ct. at 15 (1942).
33Note also that the proclamation of the President closing the courts to certain persons
-was limited to those who, inter alia, ". . . enter or attempt to enter the United States
... through coastal or boundary defenses. . . ." See p. - supra.3 4The question of what court should determine this basic fact was not raised by the
Quiri case since facts were admitted which established that the petitioners were enemy
belligerents. See second paragraph of note 23 supra.
35Cf. Morgan at 105-107, 112-114. A World War I attempt to confer jurisdiction on
courts-martial by declaring thb United States "a part of the zone of operations con-
ducted by the enemy" and defining spy to include "any person who should endanger
good discipline, order, movements, health, safety, or successful operations of the land
or naval forces" [see Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 4364,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) 3-4], was opposed by President Wilson and died in com-
mittee. Said the President: "I am wholly and unalterably opposed to such legislation
... I think it not only unconstitutional but that in character it would put us on the
level of the very people we are fighting and affecting to despise. It would be altogether
inconsistent with the spirit and practice of America. . . ." Letter to Senator Overman,
N. Y. Times, April 23, 1918, p. 6, col. 1. Mr. Charles Warren had argued that such
a bill was constitutional as within the war power of Congress. See Warren, Military
Tribunals and Spies (1919) 53 Am. L. REv. 195. See also Kroch; When Martial Law
Was Proposed for Everybody, N. Y. Times, July 14, 1942, p. 18, col. 5.
[Vol. 29
TRIAL OF BELLIGERENTS
who carries on a private war, is a civilian gone wrong, and is entitled to
trial by jury before a civil court, unless the locus of his offense puts him
within the jurisdiction of the military. But the agent-saboteur himself would
present a closer case. Even though nominally a citizen of the United States,
if he had taken an oath of allegiance to the enemy government, or accepted
a billet in the enemy army, he, would probably be an "enemy belligerent"
and, following the implications of the Quirin case, would be subject to trial
by military commission.
The rationale adopted by-the Court is new. In accordance with the lan-
guage of the Milligan case, both the Attorney General and the courts have
in the past explained the jurisdiction of military tribunals over "civilians,"
where martial law has not been declared, as jurisdiction over offenses occur-
ring in the "theater of war." Thus it was argued at length by the govern-
ment in the Quirin case that the eastern seaboard of the United States was
in a theater of operations, an argument not unreasonable when submarines
were sinking ships within sight of the shore. 36 And in the original opinion
in the World War I case of Pablo Waberski, the Attorney General was em-
phatic as to the court-martial's lack of jurisdiction to try the alleged agent-
saboteur.
37
"However, if there were no Milligan case to furnish us with an
authoritative precedent, the provisions of the Constitution would them-
selves plainly bring us to the same conclusions as those set forth in
the opinion of the court in that case, namely, that in this country, mili-
tary tribunals, whether courts-martial or military commissions, cannot
constitutionally be granted jurisdiction to try persons charged with acts
or offences committed outside of the field of military operations or ter-
ritory under martial law or other peculiarly military territory, except
members of the military or naval forces or those immediately attached
to the forces such as camp followers. Were this'not the correct conclu-
sion, then any person accused of espionage, for instance, wherever
apprehended and wherever the act charged may have been committed,
would immediately become subject to the jurisdiction of a military court,
and all the above-cited provisions of the Constitution would be rendered
nugatory in the cases of the most grave class of crimes, generally carry-
ing the death penalty."
The Attorney General had assumed that Waberski was a Russian and
36See Brief for Respondent, 10-11, 46-47, United States ex reL Burger v. Cox, 317
U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) ; Munson, supra note 18, at 247. The fact that the Court
did not explain military jurisdiction in the Quirin case as jurisdiction over offenses
committed in the "theater of operations" may indicate that it considered the "theater
of operations," for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on military courts, to be limited
to the area of actual combat.
3731 Ops. ATr'Y GEN. (1918) 356, 361 (italics added).
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that he "had not come through the fighting lines or field of military opera-
tions," but his language was not restricted to that case. When it was later
discovered that Waberski was a German and was arrested in the vicinity
-of military encampments, after having crossed the border several times, a
subsequent Attorney General assured the Secretary of War that the court-
martial had had jurisdiction to try Waberski. 3s
In another case growing out of World War I which involved a test of the
jurisdiction of a naval court-martial to try an officer of the Imperial German
Navy apprehended about the port of New York in 1918, under a forged
passport, while masquerading as a Swiss business man, a district court, in
upholding the jurisdiction of the court-martial, said :89
"Military authorities should have power to try spies wherever found;
otherwise they may not be subject to trial for that offense. . . . The
term 'theater of war,' as used in the Milligan Case, apparently was in-
tended' to mean the territory of activity of conflict. With the progress
made in obtaining ways and means for devastation and destruction, the
territory of the United States was certainly within the field of active
operations. ... " I
The cast of this decision may have been suggested by the fact that the
accused was charged with being a spy. Spying was one of the earliest forms
of unlawful belligerency to be universally recognized as such. Summary
death for spies has been an axiom of military law throughout the history
of this country. It long antedated the more refined concepts of belligerency,
which in setting up conditions of lawful belligerency, have the further effect
of outlawing that belligerency which does not meet those conditions. Spies
have always been defined as operators found "lurking or acting as [spies]
in or about any of the fortifications of any of the armies." "Spies" were
defined by the Hague Convention as persons, who, 'inter alia, were appre-
hended "in the zone of operations." 4' Therefore, in order to convict the
prisoner as a-spy, the court-martial would have had to find that the accused
8SThis opinion was not released for publication until July 29, 1942. 40 Ops. Ar'y
GEN. No. 54 (Dec. 24, 1919).
"'United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 Fed. 754, 763-764 (E. D. N. Y.
1920), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 256 U. S. 705, 41 Sup. Ct. 535 (1921). Compare:
"the doctrine of the majority in Ex parte Milligan does not go far enough to meet
the conditions of modem war." Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National
Emergenwy (1942) 55 HAav. L. REv. 1254.40E.g., Article of War 82, 41 STAT. 804 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1554 (1940). Although
Article 81 adds "or elsewhere," this term has been construed as being constitutionally
applicable only to those persons whose offenses are committed within the zone of
operations, or who are for other reasons subject to military law. Morgan at 115-116.
See also MANUAL FOP CouRTs-M xTAL (U. S. War Dep't, 1929) § 142.
41 I-AGuE IV (1907) ANNEx, Art. 29.
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was apprehended in the "theater of war." It was not unnatural, therefore,
for the district court to consider the court-martial's jurisdiction in those
terms. An English court-martial, in a similar case, 42 rather than expand the
concept of "theater of war" in order to convict the prisoner as a spy, antici-
pated the theory of the Court in the Quirin case by convicting the prisoner as
an unlawful enemy belligerent. 43
The second contention of the petitioners raised a question which appar-
ently has escaped discussion by the writers on military law. Do the Articles
of War, restrict the power of the Commander in Chief to deal with enemy
belligerents ?4 4 An examination of the history of the Articles of War will
indicate their applicability to trials of unlawful enemy belligerents. An
analysis of the content of the Articles of War will indicate their applicability
to trials by military commissions, and the degree to which they purport to
regulate such trials. In the event it is found that they purport to regulate
such trials, a further question as to their constitutionality, arises, namely,
whether they work an undue interference by Congress with the power of
the President, acting as Commander in Chief of the Army. The Court
split as to the applicability of the Articles of War to the trial of-the sabo-
teurs. The constitutional issue was not decided, however, because, those
justices who believed the Articles of War to be applicable found the pro-
cedure prescribed by the President and employed by the commission to be
consonant with those Articles. 45
III. THE ARTICLES OF WAR, 1775-1912
The trial of the saboteurs was governed by military law. In its ordinary
sense, military law is the law governing the Army as a separate community.
In a wider sense, it includes that part of the law of nations which regulates
the relations of enemies in time of war.4 6 Its code of laws in the national
4 2 In 1914, one Lody, a German subject, 'was accused of attempting to give information
to the German Government in letters from Dublin. He was tried by a general court-
martial as a "war criminal," sentenced to death, and shot. See PHILLIPsoN, INxTERNA-
TIoNAL LAW AND THE GREAT WAR (1915) 215. Phillipson comments that the "punish-
ment was inflicted conformably to the customary international martial law." Id. at 216.43 In orderlto reach the result of the Lody case, the Court would have had to con-
sider the naval court-martial as a court administering the 'international law of war
rather than a naval court-martial proper, for the Articles for the Government of the
Navy do not provide for the trial of offenders against the laws of war other than spies.
See Articles for the Government of the Navy, REv. STAT. § 1624 (1875), 34 U. S. C.
§ 1200 (1940).4 4 Professor Morgan noticed an analogous problem in connection with the trial of
Major Andr6 by a "Board of General Officers" after the Continental Congress had
directed that trial of spies be by court-martial. See, Morgan at 107, n. 101. See p. 67
infra.
45317 U. S. at 47-48, 63 Sup. Ct. at 20 (1942).46See 1 WINTHROP 1, 44.
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sense is the Articles of War. Its code, in the international sense, is the
common law of war.
47
The custom' of governing armies by articles of war, or ordinances for
the government of the army, as they were called, extends far back into his-
tory.48 The earliest British ordinances were issued under the prerogative
power of the Crown, either by the king himself or by the commanders in
chief holding commissions from the king, and continued in force only so
long as the war continued. Later codes were effective during peace as well as
in time of war. On the commencement of hostilities in America, the assem-
blies of the several colonies enacted articles of war for the government of
their contingents, 49 and on June 30, 1775, the Second Continental Congress
enacted the first American Articles of War, which were patterned largely
after the contemporary British code. 50 The Articles were revised and enlarged
in the fall of 1775 and again in September, 1776.5 This amended code be-
came the American Articles of War. These articles for 140 years, without
substantial systematic change, governed the Army of the United States.
The Articles of War established the court-martial system fo; the trial
and punishment of offenders against them. The jurisdiction of courts-
martial as therein established was limited to members of the Army, and to
certain limited classes of civilians who were intimately associated with the
Army52 or who, because they owed allegiance to the United States and
jeopardized the safety of the Army in the theater of operations in war
time, were deemed amenable to trial by military courts-martial. 53 The Arti-
cles made no reference to, or provision for, the trial of enemy belligerents
accused of violating the law of war. That was left to the common law of war.
Shortly after the enactment of the Articles, the Continental Congress
specifically recognized one type of unlawful enemy belligerent, enemy spies.
The Congress :54
47See pp. 53-57 supra.
48S'ee the Ordinance of Richard I - A. D. 1190, printed at 2 WINTHROP 1411, and
the Articles of War of Richard II - A. D. 1385, id. at 1412.49E.g., Mass. Bay, April 5, 1775, 1 Am. ARcH. (4th Ser'. 1839) 1350; Conn., May 31,
1775, 2 id. at 565; N. H., June 29, 1775, 2 id 1180. (N. H. adopted the Mass. Articles).
The Mass. Articles are 'printed at 2 WINTHROP 1470.
r01 JouR. CONG. 90 (fune 30, 1775), 2 WINTHROP 1478. The contemporary British
articles are printed at 2 WINTHROP 1448.511d. at 12. The 1776 Articles are printed at 2 WINTHROP 1489.52Section XIII, Art. 23, of the 1776 Articles makes the articles applicable to "all
suttlers and retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of
the United States in the field."53E.g., Articles of War, 1776, § XIII, Art. 18, subjects "Whosoever shall relieve the
enemy with money, victuals," etc., to trial by court-martial; Art. 19 refers to "who-
soever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the
enemy.!
541 JOUR. CONG. 450 (Aug. 21, 1776) ; see Morgan at 108.
[Vol. 29
TRIAL OF BELLIGERENTS
"RESOLVED, That all persons, not members of, nor owing alle-
giance to, any of the United States of America... who shall be found
lurking as spies in or about the f6rtifications or encampments of the
armies of the United States ... shall suffer death, according to the law
and usage of nations, by sentence of a court-martial, or such other
punishment as such court-martial shall direct."
This resolution was ordered printed "at the end of the Articles of War."
In so far as this statute defined spies and subjected them to trial and punish-
ment, it was declaratory of the practice of all nations. It went further and
specified that trial be by court-martial. At this time, the court-martial was
the universal military court. Its procedure was designed to meet the require-
ments of expediency and severe discipline demanded by the military. It
is not extraordinary that in providing for the trial of spies, the Continental
Congress should select a ready-made military procedure-trial by general
court-martial. In so doing, the Congre'ss accepted a familiar and regular
procedure in place of the uncertain content of a trial ordered by a military
commander acting independently. The Congress determined that spies would
be tried by a military court governed by the same rules as the courts which
tried the members of our own military forces. International law could ask
no more. It is significant that this statute was not included as one of the
Articles of War, but rather was enacted as an independent statute which
was printed in juxtaposition to the Articles of War only because the Con-
gress resorted to the procedure established by the Articles.
One of the best known spy cases of the revolutionary period is that of
Major John Andr6, Adjutant General of the British Army in America, who
had entered the American lines at the behest of Major General Arnold and
was apprehended while attempting, in disguise, to return to the British lines,
after receiving certain information relative to the surrender of West Point
from the treasonous General Arnold.55 The circumstances of Major Andre's
arrest caused considerable public excitement and official debate as to Andre's
guilt as a spy, the British contending that the circumstances of Andre's
conduct saved him from .that status. A board of fourteen general officers
was convened by General Washington to try Andre. This "Board of General
Officers" having "maturely considered the facts," reported that Andr6
cc*. ought to be considered a spy from the enemy, and that agreeable
to the law and usage of nations . . . ought to suffer death."
Accordingly, Andr6 was banged on October 2, 1780.
55The circumstances of Andre's arrest and trial are, set forth in the well-documented
article in 2 STOWELL AND MONROE, INTERNATIONAL CASES (1916) 78-87. See also
Halleck, Military Espionage (1911) 5 Am. J. INT: L. 590,-598 et seq.
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It is clear that the spy resolution quoted above was applicable to the trial
of Major Andr6, and it seems equally clear that General Washington was
aware of the statute, 'for he had 'confirmed at least three sentences of death
by courts-martial in cases involving enemy spies previous to the Andr6
affair.56 It seems probable that General Washington, moved by official
clamor and the public interest in the case, sought to create an extraordinary
court of great prestige in order to subdue the certain criticism of those on
both sides who thought Andr6 not subject to punishment as a spy, and to
forestall unjustified retaliation by the British.
The Articles of War, as amended during the course of the Revolution,
,survived the adoption of the Constitution. One of the first.acts of the First
Congress continued in force the existing Articles of War.' 7 In 1806, the
Articles, with some minor modifications, were re-enacted so as to meet the
requirements of the Constitution; for example, by substituting the President
for Congress in cases in which Congress had previously been vested with
final revisory authority. 8 It is significant that the code of 1806 did not
include the spy resolution as an Article of War. It was revised, however,
so as to make the death penalty mandatory, and re-enacted at the same time
as the revised Articles of War.59
In this form, the Articles of War stood for many years without further
change. They were the articles which governed the army of General Scott,
as it advanced on Mexico City and later occupied that area. In addition to
problems of discipline of his own forces, General Scott, as commanfder in
chief of America's first successful expeditionary army, was faced with the
new problem of providing for the discipline of the population of invaded and
occupied areas. Within this group there were two classes of offenders-
those who violated the usual criminal laws and in time of peace would be
,tried by the civil courts, and those who transgressed the laws of war and
"unlawfully" made war on the invading.forces. These persons were without
the protection of the United States Constitution, and their punishment was
completely within the discretion of the military commander, who could be ex-
pected to conduct himself, in so far as expedient, according to the principles
and usages of war. A court designated a "court-martial" and conducting
its business in accordance with the Articles of War could have been con-
56The general orders signed by General Washington confirming the sentences are
printed in 15 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON (Bicentennial Comm'ni ed. 1936) 364; 13 id.
139-140; 19 id. 23.
571 STAT. 96 (Sept. 29, 1789).
582 STAT. 359 (Apr. 10, 1806) ; see 1 WINTHROP 51.
592 STAT. 371-372 (Apr. 10, 1806).
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vened to try these cases.60 International law could ask no more. But this was
objectionable, since the jurisdiction of courts-martial, as set forth in the
Articles of War and other statutes, did not include cognizance of these
types of cases, and in general administrative convenience suggested that
the several types of cases ought to be handled separately.61 Consequently,
General Scott, by General Order No. 20 issued at Tampico on February 19,
1847, established a "military commission" to try those criminal cases which
ordinarily would have been tried in the civil courts, and a "council of war"
to try persons charged with violating the laws of war.
This convenient dichotomy of General Scott disappeared during the Civil
War, when military courts for the trial of offenses against the laws of
war were, in addition to the military government courts, designated as
"military commissions. '62
"Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred
and defined by statute; second, that which is derived from the common
law of war. Military offences under the statute law must be tried in
the manner therein directed; but military offences which do not come
within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law
of war .... In the armies of the United States the first is exercised by
courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the 'Rules and
Articles of War,' or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts-
martial, are tried by military commissions.
' 63
Its jurisdiction so defined, the military commission gained a firm position
as a competent American military tribunal. It was recognized by the execu-
tive,6 4 by Congress, 5 and by the courts.6 6 The spy statute, which in 1861
had been made applicable to "all persons,"67 i.e., both citizens and aliens,
was further amended to permit trial by military commission. Though its
procedure was not regulated by statute, it was usual for commissions to
6OThough not a court-martial proper, it would still have been a legal body under
the laws of war. See 2 WINTHROP 1296.61See 2 WINTHROP 1296-1297.
6 2 See note 2 supra.
63G. 0. No. 100 (1863) Art. 13 (italics added), quoted in part by the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Vallandighan, 1 Wall. 243, 249 (U. S. 1863). In England the
court-martial is the universal military court. The jurisdictional distinction -between
courts-martial and military commissions which obtained in the United States during
the Civil War period was viewed with favor by some English writers. 2 WINTHROP
1296.6411 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (1865) 297.
65See note 68 htfra.
66EX parte Vallandigham, supra note 63.
6712 STAT. 340 (1862).
6812 STAT. 737 (1863).
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adhere to the rules prescribed for courts-martial by the Articles of War.69
In 1874, in the course of the preparation of the Revised Statutes, the
Articles of War were rearranged, reworded, and combined, but under the
limited authority of the revisers, no changes in substance were made.
The Articles in this form continued through the Spanish War, and into
the twentieth century.
I IV. ARTICLES OF WAR, 1912-42
By 1912, the necessity for a thoroughgoing revision of the Articles of'
War was appreciated on all sides. A twentieth-century army was func-
tioning under an eighteenth-century code. Even President Wilson, in en-
dorsing their revision, referred to the existing code as "archaic." 70 At the
instance of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, a revised military
code was introduced into Congress in 1912, and extensive hearings were
conducted by the House Committee on Military Affairs. Ten articles dealing
with the classification and jurisdiction of courts-martial-the most urgent
of the revised Articles proposed in 1912-were passed in 1913.71 In subse-
quent sessions of Congress the question of the revision of the Articles of
War was frequently raised and a revised code was twice passed by the Sen-
ate,72 but it was not until 1916 that a revised code was forced through the
House by attaching it as an amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill.73
The War Department describes the code of 1916 as "a complete revision
which . . . introduced many modifications and changes looking toward a
scientific and modern statement of military law."'74 The fundamental short-
comings of the 1916 code, however, were vigorously pointed out by Assistant
Judge Advocate General Ansell and others who fought to establish reason-
able procedural safeguards and the principle of judicial review of the often
arbitrary court-martial proceedings." Their efforts were partially successful,
69 DIGEST Ops. J. A. G. (1912) 1070. See also WINTHROP 841-842; BENET, MILITARY
LAW AND THE PRACrICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL (1868) 204, 212; DAVIS, MILITARY LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1913) 308, 313; DUDLEY, MILITARY LAW (1908) 314;
SEN. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) app. 40 (statement of J. A. G.
Crowder).7OSee H. R. Doc. No. 1334, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) 1.
7137 STAT. 721-723 (1913). This partial revision of the Articles was deemed a tem-
porary expedient only. See SEN. REP. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) 20:72For a comprehensive statement of attempts, 1912 to 1915, to revise the Articles
of War, see 52 CONG. REc. 4301-4303 (1915).
7339 STAT. 650-670 (Aug. 29, 1916). See 53 CONG. Rlc. 11509-11512 (1916).74 MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (War Dep't, 8th ed. 1939) 163.75See Hearings before sicb-committee of Committee on. Military Affairs on S. 64,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) 51 et seq. (remarks of Gen. Ansell), 1371 et seq. (remarks
of Lt. Col. Morgan). But see id. at 170 et seq. (remarks of J. A. G. Crowder);
WIGMORE, MILITARY JUSTICE DURING WAR (1919).
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and in 1920 the Articles of War were amended to require review of the
more serious sentences by a board of officers of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Department and a finding that the records upon which such sentences
were based were legally sufficient to support the sentence, before the sentence
could be carried into execution. 6 In addition, the revised Articles required
that a thorough and impartial investigation of charges be made before re-
ferring them for trial,77 and that a qualified law member be appointed to
each general court-martial with functions similar to those of a civil judge
in the conduct of a jury trial. 78
Of importance to the argument here, the revisions of 1916 and 1920
mentioned military commissions, or substituted "military tribunals" for
"courts-martial," in eleven of the Articles. At the same time the original
reason for the military commission had substantially ceased, for courts-
martial were given jurisdiction over "any person who by the law of war is
subject to trial by military tribunals. '79
General Crowder had explained the functions of the military commission
to the House Committee on Military Affairs, and commented that it was
"an institution of the greatest importance in a period of war."' 0 A little
later he pointed out that "the constitution, composition, and jurisdiction of
these courts have never been 'regulated by statute,"8' and added that "it is
highly desirable that this important war court should be continued to be
governed as heretofore by the laws of war rather than by statute." The
Articles of War, however, as finally enacted did more than recognize and
preserve the common law of war jurisdiction of military commissions.8 2
An examination of the legislative history and content of those articles
which are applicable by their terms to military commissions will assist in
76Article of War 50/2, 41 STAT. 799 (1920), amended 50 STAT. 724 (1937), 10
U. S. C. § 1522 (1940).77Article of War 70, 41 STAT. 802 (1920), amended, 50 STAT. 724 (1937), 10 U. S. C.§ 1542 (1940).78Article of War 8, 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1479 (1940).
79Article of War 12, 41 STAT. 789 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1483 (1940). This article
originally appeared as paragraph 8 of the 1913 partial revision. 37 STAT. 722 (1913).
An important limitation on the capacity of courts-martial to deal with unlawful enemy
belligerents continued, however, for Congress authorized courts-martial to inflict the
death -penalty only "in cases expressly mentioned" in the Articles of War. See p. 84
infra.
8 0Hearings before Committee on Military Affairs on H. R. 23628, 62d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1912) 28.
81d at 35.
82The implications of this fact as regards the procedure of military' commissions has,
so far as is known, escaped notice except in WEINER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL
LAW (1940) 122-125. Thecurrent court-martial manual ignores them. In an article
focused on the Quirin case, the Judge Advocate General indicated the problem but did
not discuss it. See Cramer, supra note 18, at 255.
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the determination of the extent, if any, to which Congress intended to regu-
late these courts. The articles in question will be considered in numerical
order.8s
Article of War 15
"The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost
courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect
of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals."
Article 12 gives courts-martial jurisdiction to try "any person subject to
military law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles, and.
any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribu-
nals." Thus the jurisdiction of courts-martial is not limited to the persons
defined in Article of War 2 as subject to military law, but includes "any
other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals."8 4
Thus Congress has made provision for trials of offenders against the laws
of war; and every case involving a violation of the laws of war which might
be tried by a military commission, including cases involving unlawful enemy
belligerents, might, under Article 12, also be tried by a court-martial.8 5
Lest this express award of jurisdiction over cases previously tried by mili-
tary commissions be construed as deprivinj military commissions of con-
current jurisdiction, Article 15 was enacted.86 This article in no way
restricts or enlarges the common law of war jurisdiction of the military
commission; it merely saves to the. commission the jurisdiction it already
had. Under it the military commander, in a proper case, is at liberty to
employ either court, "whichever happens to /be convenient."
87
S3Hereafter all references to the Articles of War, unless otherwise indicated, are to
the 1920 code, 41 STAT. 787-812, as amended, 46 STAT. 1203 (1931), 50 STAT. 724 (1937),
56 STAT. 732 (1942), 10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593a (1940), (hereinafter cited by article
number only). Except as hereafter indicated, all the provisions relative to military
commissions appeared in the 1916 code. The Articles will be discussed only as to
implications with regard to trials by military commissions. The word "commission!
has been italicized in all instances where it appears in quoted portions of the Articles.84General Crowder considered this provision to be declaratory of the jurisdiction of
general courts-martial. See Hearings on H. R. 23628, slepra note 80, at 28.85See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 27, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 10 (1942).86See SEN. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916) app. 40 (remarks of J. A. G.
Crowder). Cf. ESPIONAGE AcT oF 1917, 40 STAT. 217, 50 U. S. C. § 38 (1940) (award
of jurisdiction over certain war offenses to civil courts shall not "be deemed to limit
the jurisdiction of the general courts-martial, military commissions . . .").87General Crowder did not explain the factors which might enter into this determi-
nation of "convenience." He assured the Senate committee, however, that "both classes
of courts have the same procedure." See SEN. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.(1916) app. 40.
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Article of War 23
Article 23 gives military commissions power to compel testimony from
persons not subject to military law by providing that such persons,
"being duly subpoenaed to appear as .a witness before any military
court, commission . . . refuses to appear, or refuses to qualify as a
witness, or to testify ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, for
which such person shall be punished on information in the District
Court of the United States ..
This provision assures to the military commission the same power to
compel testimony that is possessed by the civil courts. In extending the arm
of the military commission, Congress has been careful not to place, the
punishing power in the commission, but rather to leave punishment in the
civil courts which may judge the crime against the civilian in accordance
'with civil law standards.
A proviso to this article requires that any person,
"not subject to military law, who before any .. military tribunal. ..
is guilty of any of the acts made punishable as offenses against public
justice by any provision of sections 231-241 of Title 18, shall be pun-
ished as therein provided."
Sections 231-241 of Title 1888 provide for the punishment in the courts
of the United States of perjury, bribery, destroying public records, etc.
This proviso, like the principal part of Article 23, increases the power of
the commission over persons who, previous to its enactment, it could not
reach. But here again, Congress stopped short of placing the punishment
of the crime in the hands of the military tribunal.
It is interesting to note that this provision assumes that the services of
the United States courts are available. This is small limitation on the power,
for where United States courts are not available, it is probable that most
of the witnesses who might be called before the commission would be per-
sons subject to military law, and therefore within the complete control of
the commission.
Article of War 24
"No witness before a military court, commission ...shall be com-
pelled* to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to
which may tend to incriminate him, or to answer any question not mate-
rial to the issue when such answer might tend to degrade him."
Article 24 codifies in the military law the general principle of the common
8835 STATJ 1101 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §§ 231-251 (1940).
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law, affirmed in the Constitution, that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 89 This principle, indeed, has
always been held applicable to trials before military tribunals.90
In its terms, Article 24 gives any witness the right to stand mute before
a military commission where the answer to a question would tend to in-
criminate him, or is immaterial to the issue and tends to degrade him. In
its terms, it places a duty upon officers as regards the conduct of the exami-
nation of all witnesses. It is natural that Congress might seek to make
express the applicability of this fundamental -safeguard to the questioning
of witnesses who, but for the circumstances of the trial, would have been
within the protection of the constitutional guarantee. It is not so natural
that Congress would extend this provision to persons who have no rights
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Articles of War 25, 26
"A duly authenticated deposition . . .may be read in evidence before
any military court or connission in any case not capital . . . if such
deposition be taken when the witness resides . . . beyond the . . .
distance of one hundred miles from the place of trial . . .or other rea-
sonable cause, is unable to appear . . .Provided, That testimony by
deposition may be adduced for the defense in capital cases."
"Depositions to be read in evidence before military courts, commnis-
sions .. .may be taken before . . .any officer, military or civil, author-
ized by the laws of the United States or by the laws of the place where
the deposition is taken to administer oaths."
Articles 25 and 26 preclude the admission of depositions not taken in
accordance with their terms, and of depositions offered by the prosecution
in capital cases. The rules are expressly made applicable to proceedings be-
fore any "military court or commission." In explaining the changes in
existing law made in his proposed revision of the Articles of War, General
Crowder pointed out that this article had been broadened to include military
commissions and went on to explain that such commissions were our common
law of war courts, and had jurisdiction over persons who had violated the
laws of war.91
Article of War 27
Article of War 27 provides that the records of proceedings of a court of
inquiry may, with the consent of the accused, be read in evidence before
89U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.
9OSee 1 WINTHROP 523-526.9lHearings on H. R. 23628, mipra note 80, at 35.
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a military commission in any case not capital nor extending to the dismissal
of an officer. A court of inquiry is a summary investigatory board which
may be convened upon the demand of one accused to investigate the accusa-
tion and report the facts.9 2 The earlier article on the admissibility of pro-
ceedings of a court of inquiry93 was applicable to courts-martial only, and
provided that such records were admissible in cases not capital provided
that oral testimony was not obtainable. The revision of 1916 made the
article applicable to military commissions, and provided further that such
evidence could be adduced by the defense in capital cases. In 1920, the
protection to the accused was further enlarged by conditioning the admissi-
bility of such evidence upon his consent. It is at least questionable that
Congress intended to place a commander in the field in the position of being
requitred to request the consent of an enemy spy before the record of a court
of inquiry could be placed before a court-martial or military commission try-
ing the spy. In its terms, however, the article is applicable to proceedings
of all military commissions.
Article of War 32
Article -32 gives a "military tribunal" power to punish as for contempt
"4any person" who uses menacing words, signs, or gestures in its presence
and provides maximum punishments therefor. This article was made ap-
plicable to military commissions for the first time in the revision of 1920,
which substituted the words "military tribunal" for "court-martial" in the
article.94 The punishment which might be imposed by a military commission
for such contempts was thus limited to the maximum declared in the article.
Article of War 38
"Tne President may, by regulations, which he 'may modify from time
to time, prescribe the procedure; including modes of proof, in cases
before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commdssions, and other
military tribunals, which regulations shall insofar as he shall deem prac-
ticable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the district courts of the United States: Provided,
That nothing contrary to or inconsistent with these articles shall be so
prescribed: Provided further, That all rules made in pursuance of this
article shall be laid before the Congress annually."
In providing that the President may prescribe the procedure in cases be-
92See Articles of War 115-121.93 REv. STAT. § 1342, Art. 121 (1875).
94 Military commissions had previously punished contempts, not by virtue of any
statutory authority, but under their general province as courts administering the law
of war. See 2 WINTHROP 1313, n. 29.
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fore military tribunals, the act makes express a power always exercised by
the, War Department through its Manual for Courts-Martial, which have
been published from time to time for the guidance of officers in the field.
"The revision will make certain a great deal that has been read into the
existing code by construction."9 5
The provision that these regulations shall apply the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases provides a standard, but
in no way limits the rules of evidence which may be prescribed. For this
reason the Army General Staff, in its review of the 1916 bill, did not
approve the section. They were "afraid that the President might exercise
his power in a way that would jeopardize the accused." The Secretary of
War, however, assured the Senate that he did not construe the article as
giving the President the "power to alter the more essential rules of evidetice,"
and he suggested that if. the Senate did so construe the article, that they
should amend the provision to exclude this construction. 6 The Senate did
not amend the provision. A general control, however, was maintained by
providing that all rules made in pursuance of this article must be laid before
Congress annually.
The requirement that nothing contrary to or inconsistent with the Articles
of War shall be prescribed, is mandatory. The article thus restricts the
"procedure, including modes of proof," which the President may prescribe
for trials before military commissions, but only insofar as certain of the
articles are made expressly applicable to such trials. 7 The restrictions im-
posed by the relevant articles are summarized elsewhere.98 The regulations
prescribed by the President in the order convening the commission for the
trial of the saboteurs, however, will be examined here. In that -prder,9
95Hearings on H. R. 23628, supra note 80, at 39 (remark by J. A. G. Crowder).96See SEN. REP. No.-130, supra note 87, app. at 97.971t was argued at the trial in the Quirin case that this proviso adopted for military
commissions the procedure, including modes of proof, which is prescribed for courts-
martial. See Munson, supra note 18, at 251. In view of the fact that the Quirin case
upheld the President's order, which prescribed rules in four respects inconsistent with
the Articles of War (see text), and the procedure of the commission, which departed
from established court-martial rules in at least two additional respects (no peremptory
challenges allowed, contrary to Article 18; confessions of each prisoner admitted against
other prisoners, contrary to § 114 (c) of the Manual for Courts-MArtial), this view
is now untenable. See Munson, id. at 241. It is settled that the civil courts have no
authority to review the methods of procedure followed by a Military commission where
no relevant statute has been violated. Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (U. S. 1863).
As unlawful enemy belligerents are not entitled to the protection afforded by the con-
stitutional guarantees, the procedural requirements of the due process clause are, not
relevant. See 11 O's. Ar'y GEN. (1865) 297, 313; Note (1943) 56 H.,v. L. REv.
631, 642.9SSee p. 79 infra.
q9 See p.,58 supra.
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the President directed that "such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the
opinion of the President of the Commission, have probative value to a
reasonable man"-a strange and unusual standard in a case where the
accused is on trial for his life. Those members of the Supreme Court who
considered the provisions of this article to be applicable to the trial, however,
held the procedure prescribed for the trial to be in consonance therewith. 1 °
Of course, their judgment was determined in the light of the actual proce-
dure of the commission as disclosed by the record. In the order convening
the commission, the President further directed that the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members of the commission present would be sufficient for a
conviction or sentence. As Article 43, which requires a unanimous verdict
to convict of an offense for which the death penalty is mandatory, or to
return a sentence of death, is .applicable only to convictions and sentences
imposed by general courts-martial, the President was limited only by the
uncertain content of international law in prescribing the vote necessary to
convict or sentence. Nor was he guided by any relevant usages in this
regard, for all the military commission precedents antedate 1920, before
which date the requirement of a unanimous verdict in capital cases was not
a part of our military law.1 1 The President did not detail a member of the
commission as law member as required in the case of courts-martial by
Article 8. This is not objectionable, as there is no indication in the Articles
of War, or elsewhere, that this article is applicable to military commissions.
The legality of the further direction that the record of the trial be trans-
mitted directly to the President is examined below under Article 46.
Article of War 46/
"Under such regulations as may be prescribed by the President every
record of trial by general court-martial or military commission received
by a reviewing or confirming authority shall be referred by him, before
he acts thereon, to his staff Judge Advocate, or to the Judge Advocate
General. No sentence of a court-martial 9hall be carried into execution
until the same shall have been approved by the officer appointing the
court or by the officer commanding for the time being."
The first sentence of this article was added by the revision of 1920, and
was intended to help assure that no sentence would be carried into execution
100317 U. S. at 46-48, 63 Sup. Ct. at 20 (1942).
'0 1Under the 1916 and previous codes, concurrence of two-thirds of the members
of a general court-martial was sufficient to support a sentence or conviction requiring
death. See Article of War 43, 39 STAT. 657 (1916). The present requirement of a
unanimous verdict to convict in certain cases has recently been critically examined.
See Sabel, Court-Martial Decsions by Divided Courts (1943) 28 CoRIN.I L. Q. 165.
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where the record of the trial did not support the judgment of the court. This
effect it will have, so long as the judge advocate to whom it is referred
exercises an independent judgment. Nothing in this article requires that the
record of a trial by military commission be reviewed. In situations where
the record of a trial by military commission is received by a reviewing or
confirming authority, however, the article is mandatory. In the Quirin case,
the President directed that the record "shall be transmitted directly to-me
for my action thereon." This direct reference to the Commander in Chief
was peculiarly appropriate due to the fact that the Judge Advocate General
acted as a prosecutor in the case and for that reason neither he nor his mili-
tary subordinates could qualify as disinterested reviewers. Possibly it was
in recognition of this fact that those members of the court who deemed this
article applicable to the trial, found the prescribed procedure not inconsistent
therewith 0 2
Article of War 80
"Any person subject to military law who buys, sells, trades . . . cap-
tured or abandoned property .. .advantage to himself ... shall ...
be punished . . . as a court-martial, military commission, or other mili-
tary'tribunal may adjudge.. .."
Article 80 gives military commissions jurisdiction concurrent with that
of courts-martial over, the statutory crime defined therein. As dealing in
captured or abandoned property is not an offense against the common law
of war, military commissions would not otherwise have jurisdiction to try
persons accused of the violation of its provisions.
Article of War 81
"Whosoever relieves or attempts to relieve the enemy with arms,
ammunition, supplies, money, or other thing, or knowingly harbors or
protects or holds correspondence with or gives intelligence to the enemy,
either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment
as a court-martial or military conmnission may direct."
General Crowder explained: "As the offenses. denounced by the Article
may and. usually will be committed by persons outside the Army, I think
the jurisdiction of a military commission for their trial should have been
102317 U. S. at 46-48, 63 Sup. Ct. at 20 (1942). The fact that the President, as the
supreme military authority, has the power to substitute his own judgment for that of
his subordinates is not of itself a sufficient reason for construing the Article as in-
applicable to this case. Subordinate military commanders have a similar power over
their subordinates. The President, of course, as head of our system of military justice,
could be relied on, in most cases, to exercise his confirming authority in a conservative
way.
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recognized in the old statute, because military commissions will in time of
war try most of these offenses. The new article is drafted so as to recognize
the jurisdiction of a military commission in such cases."'1- 3 General Crow-
der's statement that military commissions should have been recognized in the
old statute is correct, but his reason is out of date, or assumes that the ex-
panded jurisdiction of courts-martial will be ignored.
Article of War 82
"Any person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a
spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encamp-
ments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be
tried by a general court-martial or by a mdlitary commission, and shall,
on conviction thereof, suffer death."
Article 82 is a re-enactment of the Civil War statute previously noticed.10 4
It defines the only offense for which the death penalty is mandatory. To
this extent, it governs military commissions.
Article of War 115
Article of War 115 gives the president of a military commission power
to appoint reporters, interpreters, etc. It serves to assure the fiscal officer
in the field that expenditures for the stated purposes are proper. It is fur-
ther recognition by Congress of military commissions; it in no way affects
their jurisdiction or procedure. 05
S'mmary
To sum up, Congress has expressly recognized the power of military
commissions over persons not subject to military law to compel testimony
through process in the district courts, and punish contempts, but the amount
of such punishment is limited. Certain safeguards, which the President is
expressly eftjoined from abridging, have been established for the protection
of the accused, viz., compulsory self-incrimination is prohibited; depositions
in capital cases are inadmissible when offered by the prosecutions; records
of courts of inquiry are inadmissible except with the consent of the accused;
all records received for review or confirmation must be referred to the Judge
Advocate General or a staff judge advocate before being acted upon by the
103 SEN. REP. No. 130, smpra note 87, at 79. See note 104 infra.
'
0 4See p. 69 stpra. The legislative history and present scope of Articles 81 and 82,
with particular reference to jurisdiction over civilians, is thoroughly examined in
Morgan at 97 et seq.
'o5Cf. 37 STAT. 575 (1912), 10 U. S. C. § 644 (1940) (enlisted men may be detailed
to serve as stenographers and reporters for military commissions).
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reviewing or confirming authority. In the case of spies, upon conviction,
the death penalty is mandatory. Finally, the common law of war jurisdiction
of military commissions is affirmed.
It might be argued that Congress intended these articles to be applicable to
military commissions only in cases involving the trial of persons who as a
class are within the sheltering arm of the Constitution of the United States
or who would under normal conditions be tried by the civil courts, and
that they are not, applicable to cases involving the trial of unlawful enemy
belligerents. It could be explained that the only article which necessarily
applies to unlawful belligerents, Article 82, which provides for the trial of
spies, was included for the sole purpose of making death mandatory in that
class of cases, and therefore should not be considered in connection with
the procedural articles applicable to commissions. It does seem strange that
Congress would make inadmissible the deposition of a coastguardman who
apprehended the accused, an enemy saboteur, after he had landed on our
shores from an enemy submarine, and who could not be made available as
a witness because of the requirements of his military duty. In the light of
history, the law has never looked kindly on the enemy belligerent. Only,
since the latter part of the nineteenth century have belligerents been uni-
versally recognized as having status according to the law of nations. It
would seem extraordinary, therefore, for Congress to better the status of
the unlawful enemy belligerent, especially during the period just precedidg
our eltry into World War I. It could be argued that although Congress
intended the Articles of War to govern the procedure of routine military
commissions, it did not intend the Articles to restrict the President acting-
in his official executive capacity.'0 6 Or it might be argued that the treatment
of unlawful enemy belligerents is a matter for the President as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, and that any legislation purporting to regu-
late such treatment would be unconstitutional 0 7 Such considerations as
these probably led some members of the Supreme Court in the Quirin case
to conclude that the Articles of War should not be construed to apply to the
trial of the saboteurs. 08
106The fact that Article 38, after authorizing "The President" to "prescribe the pro-
cedure," goes on to qualify this authority by providing that "nothing contrary to ...
these articles shall be so prescribed," would seem to leave little basis for this argument.
1o7But see pp. 83-84 infra.108317 U. S. at 47, 63 Sup. Ct. at 20 (1942). It should be noted that no element of
necessity or emergency was present in this case which would make the Articles in-
applicable as interfering with the war powers of the executive.
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An examination of the whole problem, however, has led the writer to the
opposite conclusion. .
It was indicated in Part I of this article that the status of enemy belliger-
ents is determined by the rules of international law. The law of war gives
status only to those enemy belligerents who wear distinguishing emblems
and otherwise conduct themselves in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. The rest are unlawful belligerents and are abandoned to
the grace of their captors. In the absence of overwhelming military neces-
sity, a trial should precede punishment of such belligerents, since there is
great necessity to determine the facts. International law does not presume
to prescribe the form of the trial, but Congress has from time to time
entered the field. The Ninth Congress of the United States prescribed death
for enemy spies, and at the same time prescribed the form of the trial-trial
,by court-martial. In the Mexican War the separate military tribunal for the
trial of unlawful enemy belligerents was born, and in the Civil War period it
was called a military commission and recognized by Congress and the courts
as a competent military tribunal. Congress amended the spy statute during
this period and authorized trial of enemy spies by "military commissions."
There can be no doubt that Congress intended this statute to govern a mili-
tary commission convened for the determination of questions relating to
spies, one class of unlawful enemy belligerents. By its terms the statute
contemplates trial of enemy spies, and it requires the commission, on con-
viction of the accused, to return a sentence of death. In the 1916 revision
of the Articles of War this statute was included as Article 82. The letter
of its command cannot, because it is so included, be construed as inapplicable
to enemy spies. The history of the measure indicates conclusively that
Congress intended the mandate to extend to such trials. Ten other articles
of the" revised Articles of War are applicable to military commissions. The
functions of military commissions as embracing the trial of spies and others
who offend the law of war were explained at one time or another to the
Military Affairs Committees of both the Senate'0 9 and the House,'1 0 and
these explanations were printed in the report putting the bill before Con-
gress tm In the light of this legislative history, the conclusion that Congress
used the words "military commission" with reference, inter alia, to a mili-.
tary commission convened to try unlawful enemy belligerents seems
inevitable.
'o9Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Military Affairs on S. 3191, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1916), printed as appendix to SEN. REP. No. 130, supra note 87,
app. 40.
l1 OHearings on H. R. 23628, supra note 80, at 28-29, 35.
11 1 SEN. REP. No. 130, supra note 87, app. 40.
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If the Articles of War merely recognized military commissions, this con-
clusion would be without significant consequene. But as has been shown,
the revised Articles did more than recognize military commissions; they
established certain fundamental safeguards for the protection of the ac-
cused, and declared these safeguards to be applicable to trials before
military commissions. Since Congress understood that unlawful enemy
belligerents were customarily tried by military commissions, it follows that
these safeguards are applicable to such trials. The argument that Congress
could not have intended to expand the incidents of a military trial of un-
lawful enemy belligerents at a time when "Hun" atrocity stories were filling
the newspapers, is untenable. The mandate of Congress is express, and the
motive is reasonable even assuming that fair treatment of the enemy is not
an object of their intent. The shield of a regularized procedure does not
benefit the unlawful, enemy belligerent. He will be punished provided only
that the unlawful nature of his acts is proved to the satisfaction of the
commission. Its principal intent is to save from the gibbet those who are
accused but are not guilty, and thus to preserve the orderly process of
democracy. It is believed, therefore, that Congress intended thd Articles of
War, in so far as expressly applicable to military commissions, to govern
a military commission convened for the determination of questions relating
to unlawful enemy belligerents, including persons in the position of the peti-
tions in the Quirin case-admitted enemy invaders.
It is not contended that Congress, by these articles, conferred any rights
on such unlawful enemy belligerents.1 1 2 Such an interpretation is quite
unnecessary. Rather Congress, in prescribing rules for the regulation of the
land forces of the United States, established rules to govern the conduct of
officers convening or participating in a trial by a military commission. The
articles impose on these officers certain enumerated statutory duties which
if not observed will result in a failure to accord the accused the type of trial
that Congress has declared should be given. The correlative right to this
duty to follow certain procedures, is the right and duty of the military
superiors of the officers conducting the trial, or in some cases of the civil
courts, to discipline those officers who fail to conduct themselves in the
manner in which Congress has commanded. Thus, though the Fiji Islander
or the invading saboteur who may appear as a witness before a military
112The fact that a civil court may take cognizance of a case and declare the process
of a military tribunal conducted without regard to the statutory rules to be null and
void (see note 22 szpra] does not confer a right on the unlawful belligerent, for the
court may, in its discretion, refuse to consider the case. See note 23 supra.
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commission has no privilege'against self-incrimination under the Constitu-
tion or statutes of the United States, the officer interrogating them has a
statutory duty to conduct the examination in consonance with the procedure
established by Congress.
A further question remains as to the constitutionality of these provisions,
since as construed above they purport to restrict to a degree the power of
the Commander in Chief to deal with enemy belligerents. The Constitution
gives to Congress the power "to provide for the common Defense," "to
raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," "to make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,"
and "to declare War." Congress is further authorized "To define and punish
. . . Offenses against the Law of Nations."" 3
The Constitution makes the President "the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy of United States," and charges him with the duty "to
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."" 4
As summed up in the Quirin case:n5
"The Constitution thus invests the President as Commander in Chief
with the power to wage war which Congress has declared, and to carry
into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and for
the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws de-
fining and punishing offences against the law of nations, including those
which pertain to the conduct of war."
Among the laws "passed by Congress for the conduct of the war" are the
Articles of War, herein discussed, which regulate to a degree the process of
military commissions. They are clearly constitutional, therefore, unless they
work an undue interference with the power of the President as Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy."0 An analysis of the requirements of the
applicable articles has shown that they establish certain minimum safeguards,
and with respect to one class of offenders, make a death sentence mandatory
upon conviction. As to the latter, no possible interference is present, for
the provision does not purport to impair the President's power of pardon.
As to the safeguards, they in no way impede the prosecution of the war.
That they are consistent with the demands of the military for expediency
is evidenced by the fact that the same safeguards, and many more, are thrown
about the court-martial procedure.
"13U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12, 13, 14, 11, 10, respectively.
'14U. S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and Art. II, § 3, respectively.
115317 U. S. at 26, 63 Sup. Ct. at 10 (1942).
"16See Atkisson, The Constitutional Sources of the Laws of War, SEN. Doc. No. 86,
65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) 17.
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It is concluded that Congress may restrict to a degree the power of .the
Commander in Chief to deal with enemy belligerents, and that Congress has
exercised that power by requiring the President to afford unlawful enemy
belligerents a trial with certain requisites before subjecting them to
punishment.
V. POSTSCRIPT
The Quirin case is illustrative of one class of cases which may be tried
by military commissions under the Articles of War. Although courts-martial
now have a concurrent jurisdiction over this class of cases, courts-martial
may return a sentence of death only in cases "expressly made punishable by
death" in the Articles of War." 7 Spying is the only common law of war
offense expressly mentioned in the code. The trial of other common law of
war offenses, all of which by international usage are punishable by death,
must be accomplished by military commissions if a sentence of death is to
be returned.
The import of this observation is not great, however, since a person who
has offended the common law of war could almost certainly be charged with
spying or the statutory offense of relieving the enemy, 118 both of which are
expressly made punishable by death in the Articles of War. Yet, .on its facts,
the Quirin case strongly suggested trial by military commission. The facts
suggested the military commission because they concerned persons other
than members of our armed forces, and the specification which most aptly
described the offense," 9 although cognizable by a court-martial, was not
one of those offenses for which the court-martial could return a sentence
of death. As a problem in the system of military jurisprudence, the case
revealed the uncertain position of the military commission in the law.
The commission originated as a court for the trial of persons which the
court-martial could not reach. But now that Congress has expanded the
jurisdiction of courts-martial to include cases involving violations of the
law of war which formerly wei'e tried by military commissions, the original
necessity for the military commission, except in capital cases, has ceased. It
is submitted that the next logical step is to authorize courts-martial to return
a verdict of death in cases involving violation of the common law of war,
and that then its jurisdiction as the tribunal for the trial of these cases
should be declared exclusive. That the military commission as such is no
1 7Article of War 43.
"SSee, e.g., the specifications in the Quirin case covering Charges II and III, violation
of Articles of War 81 and 82 respectively. Brief in Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus,
6-7, United States ex rel. Burger v. Cox, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).
119 Specification 1 of Charge I. Id. at 5.
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longer essential in time of war is evidenced by the fact that no commissions
were convened for the trial of unlawful enemy belligerents during World
War I.120 If it can be demonstrated, however, that there is some political,
psychological, or administrative advantage in ,retaining a military court other
than the court-martial for the trial of these cases, Congress should further
regularize the procedure of the common law of war military commission by
expressly providing by statute that "proceedings of military commissions
in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war
may be triable by such military commissions shall be governed by the rules
established for courts-martial in the Articles of War."
The flexibility and uncertainty of procedure which now characterizes the
common law of war military commission is capable of serious abuse.12 If
this flexibility is to facilitate the shot at sunrise at the insistence of a field
commander or the Commander in Chief, it is to be condemned as un-
American regardless of the fact that the person shot is thought to be an
unlawful enemy belligerent. Military justice ought to have more certain
content.
12OBrief for the Respondent, app. 76, United States ex rel. Burger v. Cox, 317 U. S.
1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942).121In the Quirb case, the Commander in Chief took advantage of the flexibility as
regards admission of evidence, the vote required to convict, and the mode of review.
See p. 58 smpra.
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